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ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: SIX
UNEXAMINED ISSUES IN ILLINOIS LAW
James B. Haddad*
Illinois courts have adopted positions on several significant
Fourth Amendment questions not yet resolved definitively by
the United States Supreme Court. The author discusses the
Illinois view in six of these situations: searches incident to ar-
rests which violate state law; searches incident to arrests under
unconstitutional statutes; searches with apparent authority;
searches of homicide scenes; entries to arrest without probable
cause to believe suspect is within; and, warrantless entries to
arrest under non-emergency circumstances. The article's unify-
ing theme is that Illinois courts have resolved these questions
without recognition of their controversial nature and without
discussion of the competing arguments. The author's purpose is
not to criticize each Illinois rule but rather to suggest issues
which deserve and which have never received substantial
consideration.
Courts do not agree on what constitutes a Fourth Amendment
violation. In particular, there are six problem areas in the law of
arrest, search and seizure: (1) searches incident to arrests which
violate state law; (2) searches incident to arrests under uncon-
stitutional penal statutes or ordinances; (3) searches with the
consent of a person who merely appears to have authority over
property; (4) homicide scene searches; (5) entries to arrest with-
out probable cause to believe that the suspect is within; and (6)
warrantless entries to arrest under non-emergency circumstances.
This Article examines rather briefly the Illinois position in each
of the first five areas and then places particular emphasis upon
the final topic of warrantless non-emergency entry to arrest. The
Illinois view on warrantless entries deserves special reconsidera-
tion, having been shaped at a relatively early stage of doctrinal
development, without the benefit of other reviewing courts' more
recent insights.
The purpose of this analysis is not to criticize six Illinois rules,
but rather to demonstrate that Illinois reviewing courts have ar-
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A., University of Notre
Dame; J.D., LL.M., Northwestern University.
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rived at their present position in each area without recognizing
the complex and controversial nature of the issues before them.'
Because the United States Supreme Court has not settled any of
the questions discussed in this Article,' the Illinois rules now
determine the fate of Illinois defendants and perhaps will con-
tinue to do so for many years to come. It is especially important
that Illinois courts devote to each topic the serious attention
which it deserves but has not yet received in Illinois.
I. FIVE RULES BRIEFLY TREATED
1. The Validity of a Search Incident to an Arrest Which Violates
State Law
Illinois courts have long assumed that if an arrest is unlawful
for any reason, a search incident to that arrest is unreasonable
1. This approach eliminates discussion of Illinois rules which may be most in need of
reform. For instance, the Illinois prohibition against relief under any circumstances for a
defendant who has been victimized by a perjurious warrant application, in the view of
many Illinois lawyers, including the author, is the least defensible of all Illinois Fourth
Amendment rules. Nevertheless, People v. Bak, 45 1ll.2d 140, 258 N.E.2d 341, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 882 (1970), the opinion which first announced that rule, reflected the judgment
of a majority of the court after full consideration of the issues. Although the published
opinion does not so reflect, the issues were considered twice, first resulting in a split
decision for the defendant and then on rehearing, after a change in the court's composi-
tion, resulting in a decision for the prosecution. Perhaps this peculiar history, together
with substantial scholarly and federal criticism, will prompt the newly-constituted Su-
preme Court of Illinois to treat the issue yet another time. See generally Herman,
Warrants for Arrest or Search: Impeaching the Allegations of a Facially Sufficient
Affidavit, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 721 (1975). See also Recent Development, 8 IND. L. REV. 738,
741 n.15 (1975).
2. Although the United States Supreme Court has made reference to most of the issues
discussed in this Article, such mention cannot be read as a pledge to resolve them in the
near future. For instance, the question of one spouse's authority to consent to a search or
seizure of the other's property was left open in Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317
(1921), and again bypassed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971).
Differing court-fashioned spousal-consent rules have prevailed in the individual states for
over half a century.
From a practical viewpoint, Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976), made the state rules
even more important. Before Stone, a decision such as United States ex rel. Pugh v. Pate,
401 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969) (striking down fictitious-
signature affidavits for warrants), although not controlling in Illinois courts, see People
v. Stansberry, 47 1ll.2d 541, 268 N.E.2d 431, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971), had enor-
mous impact on Illinois police practice. With Stone's almost total elimination of Fourth
Amendment claims as grounds for federal habeas corpus relief, even those Illinois law
enforcement officials who desire to "play it safe" need give no special deference to the
Seventh Circuit's Fourth Amendment views.
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under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, when an arrest is illegal
under state law, evidence obtained in the search must be ex-
cluded from use at trial. The appellate court's decision in People
v. Carnivale3 illustrates the point. Although the arrests of Charles
Carnivale and Nicholas Pappas were constitutionally valid be-
cause they were supported by probable cause,4 the trial court
suppressed evidence obtained incident to the arrests solely be-
cause, on the facts before the court, the Chicago police were not
empowered to effectuate the arrests in neighboring Rosemont.
The appellate court upheld the trial judge's suppression of the
evidence.' It assumed, as the Supreme Court of Illinois has often
done, that an illegal arrest simply cannot support a reasonable
search.'
Courts in other jurisdictions recently have challenged the
premise which was essential to the appellate court's decision in
Carnivale. Two courts have held that a search incident to an
arrest which is illegal "merely" because it violated a state war-
rant requirement is reasonable if it otherwise comports with fed-
eral constitutional requirements.7 A third court has upheld a
search incident to an arrest made beyond the officer's territorial
authority.' Additionally, Judge John Paul Stevens, shortly before
his elevation to the United States Supreme Court, declared on
behalf of a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel that an arrest by
state officials which is unauthorized by state law can support a
reasonable search incident thereto.' He said that the Fourth
3. 21 IlI.App.3d 780, 315 N.E.2d 609 (lst Dist. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 61 Ill. 2d
57, 329 N.E.2d 193 (1975).
4. The prosecution offered two theories to justify seizure of evidence: the doctrine of
search incident to arrest, and the authority of a valid search warrant, lawfully executed.
5. The appellate court held that under the circumstances Chicago officers were not
empowered to execute the search warrants in Rosemont. 21 Ill.App.3d at 783-85, 315
N.E.2d at 612-14.
6. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court and found it unneces-
sary to reach the illegal arrest issue. The supreme court upheld the seizure under the
authority of the search warrants rather than under a search-incident theory. 61 Ill.2d at
59, 329 N.E.2d at 194.
7. People v. Burdo, 56 Mich.App.48, 223 N.W.2d 358 (1974); State v. Eubanks, 283
N.C. 556, 196 S.E.2d 706 (1973). The North Carolina Supreme Court adhered to its
Eubanks decision in State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 201 (1975).
8. State v. Mangum, 30 N.C.App. 311, 226 S.E.2d 852 (1976).
9. United States v. McCoy, 517 F.2d 41 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975).
[Vol. 26:492
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Amendment does not require exclusion merely because state law
did not authorize the arrest. 0
There are, of course, two sides to the dispute. Those who would
uphold searches incident to arrests which, though constitutional,
violate state law think it illogical that identical conduct per-
formed by officers in different states could be judged differently
for Fourth Amendment purposes. The majority of jurisdictions,
however, reach the same result as does Illinois," apparently be-
lieving that the conduct of an officer in arresting a citizen in
violation of state law is itself a constitutionally significant fact
sufficient to negate the claim that the search incident to arrest
was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The lack of focus on the question in Illinois is surprising be-
cause in other contexts, such as a post-search obligation, the
Illinois Supreme Court has held that a "mere" violation of state
law does not make a search unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." Perhaps the explanation is that the issue is not as
important in Illinois as it is in many other states. Because Illinois
does not require an arrest warrant for any felony or misdemeanor
10. Justice Stevens suggested, quite tentatively, a distinction between an arrest which
is merely unauthorized and one which violates some prohibition in state law. He charac-
terized the McCoy arrest as unauthorized and held that such an arrest could support a
constitutionally valid search. He said that the claim for reasonableness perhaps would be
weaker if the state officer had affirmatively violated a state law. Id. at 43. To the author,
the distinction between "unauthorized" and "prohibited" seems impossible to make in
many situations. In Carnivale, for instance, the statutory scheme could be read merely to
not authorize the arrest in Rosemont, or it could be read to prohibit such arrests. In any
event, accidents of legislative draftsmanship ought not be accorded legal significance.
11. The cases cited in notes 7-9 supra represent a minority view. In most jurisdictions,
for instance, if a state warrant requirement is violated, evidence seized in the search
incident to the arrest is suppressed without further discussion. See, e.g., State v. Koon,
133 Ga. 685, 211 S.E.2d 924 (1975); State ex rel. Wilson v. Nash, 41 Ohio App.2d 201, 324
N.E.2d 774 (1974); Barr v. State, 531 P.2d 1399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Commonwealth
v. Kirkutis, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 18, 334 A.2d 682 (1975).
12. See, e.g., People v. Curry, 56 Ill.2d 162, 306 N.E.2d 292 (1973); People v. Haw-
thorne, 45 Ill.2d 176, 258 N.E.2d 319, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970). Typically, such
cases involve the failure of an officer to comply with a search or post-search obligation,
such as leaving a copy of the warrant at the place searched or filing a return after execution
of the warrant. The United States Supreme Court already has acknowledged a state's right
not to utilize the exclusionary rule to penalize such violations. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433 (1973). Admittedly, however, there is a difference between such cases and one
involving a search incident to an illegal arrest. The issue is whether the distinction is
legally significant.
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arrest, state law challenges to arrests are made less frequently in
Illinois than they are elsewhere. 3
Nevertheless, it is important that Illinois courts reexamine
their position on search-incident-to-arrest suppression decisions.
For instance, motions to suppress seem appropriate in the quite
common situation in which an officer has made a warrantless
arrest for an ordinance violation not committed in his presence.
Such an arrest is no longer expressly authorized by Illinois stat-
utes, and an argument can be made that it is illegal under state
law.'4 If the argument were accepted, a court would have to decide
whether the unlawful arrest could support a constitutionally rea-
sonable search. Particularly in light of Mr. Justice Stevens'
views, in such a case and in others posing a similar issue, 5 reflec-
tion upon the heretofore unexamined premise in Illinois law
would be merited.
2. Search Incident to Arrest Under Invalid Penal Statute or
Ordinance
A second Fourth Amendment issue is whether an arrest under
an unconstitutional penal statute or ordinance can support a
13. The Illinois Supreme Court cases generally have involved claims that state law
required a warrant for the arrest in question. The supreme court typically has responded
that no arrest warrant was required. See, e.g., People v. Edge, 406 Il1. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359
(1950); People v. Roberta, 352 Ill. 189, 185 N.E. 253 (1933). This approach has made it
unnecessary to discuss whether an arrest which is illegal under state law validates a
constitutionally reasonable search. The appellate court's decision in Carnivale may be the
only one in Illinois in which the court found it necessary to reach the issue of the unreason-
ableness of such a search. Other cases could arise, however.
14. Under former law, the statutory authority to make warrantless arrests in felony and
misdemeanor cases was interpreted to include ordinance violation cases. See People v.
Edge, 406 Il1. 490, 497-98, 94 N.E.2d 359, 363-64 (1950). The word "offense," however, as
used in the Code of Criminal Procedure, was re-defined in 1969 to exclude ordinance
violations. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §102-15 (1975). The amendment would form the
basis of the argument that the common law has been revived, so that in this class of petty
cases, an officer cannot arrest without a warrant if the offense was not committed in his
presence. So far the argument has not been presented to any Illinois reviewing court.
15. The United States Supreme Court has never considered the issue, nor has it made
explicit reference to it. An argument can be made that the Supreme Court has indulged
in the very same assumption which is reflected in the Illinois decisions, namely that an
arrest which is illegal under state law cannot support a reasonable search. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948). In no case, however, has it invalidated
a search incident to arrest merely because of a state law violation.
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search which is otherwise reasonable. For instance, in a search
incident to an arrest for one crime, an officer sometimes discovers
evidence of a more serious offense. After the prosecution has
charged the accused with the second crime,'" defense counsel
sometimes argues that the ordinance or statute under which the
original arrest was made violated the United States Constitution,
and that, therefore, the search incident to the arrest was unrea-
sonable. Although the issue resembles that discussed in the first
part of this Article, whether an arrest which violated state law
can support a reasonable search," it is also akin to the apparent
authority-consent search topic discussed below.' 8 The issue of ar-
rests under invalid statutes, like apparent authority questions,
requires reflection upon the purpose of the exclusionary rule it-
self.'9
Three recent Illinois Appellate Court cases have considered the
reasonableness of a search incident to an arrest under an invalid
ordinance. The cases reach two diametrically opposed positions,
and yet they have common failings. Each of the the three deci-
sions proceeds as if the issue previously had not confronted any
court. None cites any precedent or any cases useful by analogy.
Nor does any of the three consider arguments which might be
offered against the position which the court adopts.
In People v. Battiste'" the defendant sought to exclude from his
trial on a weapons charge a revolver discovered in a search inci-
dent to his arrest under a disorderly conduct ordinance. He
argued that the municipal ordinance violated the United States
Constitution, so that the arrest was unconstitutional and the
search incident to that arrest was unreasonable. The First Ap-
pellate District rejected the Fourth Amendment claim without
ruling on the ordinance's validity. It characterized that argument
as "novel,"'" apparently using that adjective as a synonym for
". The questions of whether the first charge is pursued, and whether a trial on the first
charge results in a conviction, have no bearing on the motion to suppress issue in connec-
tion with the trial on the second charge. See People v. Ambrose, 84 III.App.3d 402, 228
N.E.2d 517 (1967); People v. Edge, 406 Il. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950).
17. See text accompanying notes 3-15 supra.
18. See text accompanying notes 37-54 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 29-30 infra.
20. 133 III.App.2d 62, 272 N.E.2d 808 (lst Dist. 1971).
21. Id. at 64, 272 N.E.2d at 811.
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"wild" or "preposterous." Focusing upon the conduct of the offi-
cer, the court noted that he had reasonable grounds to conclude
that the accused had violated the ordinance. This was the begin-
ning and the end of the relevant inquiry as far as the court was
concerned."
One year later the Second Appellate District decided People v.
Harter23 in a remarkably different fashion. Although his trial
counsel had made no motion to suppress, the defendant on appeal
argued that certain checks should have been excluded from his
forgery trial because the checks were the fruit of an arrest under
an unconstitutional vagrancy ordinance.24 Without passing judg-
ment on the validity of that ordinance, the Second Appellate
District declared that if the ordinance were unconstitutional, "it
seems quite clear that evidence discovered in the search which
followed the arrest would have been subject to suppression.""
The Harter opinion, in effect, declared that trial counsel had been
incompetent" for failing to advance the argument dismissed by
the Battiste court as novel or preposterous. The Harter court
cited neither Battiste nor any other authority. It advanced no
arguments for its position, and it responded to no arguments for
a contrary view. It accepted as obvious the premise that an arrest
under an unconstitutional ordinance cannot support a reasonable
search.
Three years later the Third Appellate District utilized the op-
posite assumption in deciding People v. Sobol. The accused
argued that he had been arrested under a public intoxication
22. The court did note that the disposition of the first charge was not controlling on
the motion to suppress in connection with the second charge. See note 16 supra. The
accused, however, was not arguing that the motion should be sustained because he had
not been tried or convicted on the first charge. Rather he claimed that evidence should
be excluded as the fruit of an unconstitutional arrest.
23. 4 Ill.App.3d 772, 282 N.E.2d 10 (2d Dist. 1972).
24. The constitutional defect in a vagrancy ordinance may be related to the very values
which the Fourth Amendment protects. See Note, Evidence Excluded when Obtained by
Search Incident to Vagrancy Arrest under Statutes Previously Held Void for Vagueness,
18 VLL. L. REv. 117 (1972).
25. 4 IlI.App.3d at 775, 282 N.E.2d at 13.
26. Although on appeal the defendant urged that trial counsel had been incompetent,
the reviewing court preferred to say simply that, all things considered, the proceedings
below had not been fair and that the accused had been deprived of substantial rights. Id.
27. 26 Ill.App.3d 303, 325 N.E.2d 118 (3d Dist. 1975).
[Vol. 26:492
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ordinance which was unconstitutional and that, therefore, the
seizure of marijuana from his person in a search incident to that
arrest violated the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. The appellate court held that if the officer reasona-
bly believed the ordinance had been violated, the search was
reasonable even if the ordinance were invalid. The court over-
looked both Battiste and Harter. Although such oversight of pre-
cedents precisely on point is fairly common in Illinois search and
seizure decisions,2" the author's purpose is not to criticize faulty
research. Instead, the obvious contrast in the three cases high-
lights the existence of another Fourth Amendment issue which
deserves but has not received serious attention from Illinois re-
viewing courts.
The Ninth Circuit decision in Powell v. Stone29 suggests the
dimensions of the issue. It represents an attempt to engage in
reasoned analysis, weighing the competing arguments and draw-
ing upon decisions from analogous areas of the law. Considering
the relationship between an unconstitutional penal provision and
the doctrine of search incident to arrest, the Ninth Circuit re-
flected upon the purpose of the exclusionary rule. The court
reiterated a major rationale of the exclusionary rule, that exclu-
sion of illegally obtained evidence is necessary to uphold judicial
integrity. From this proposition the court concluded that judicial
integrity would be offended if the fruits of an unconstitutional
arrest were admitted into evidence. A focus upon the conduct of
the arresting officer is too narrow. The Ninth Circuit argued that
in many instances in which police in good faith have relied upon
unconstitutional statutes, 3 the United States Supreme Court has
28. For illustrations of other Fourth Amendment questions on which Illinois reviewing
courts have adopted conflicting positions while overlooking directly relevant precedent,
see J. HADDAD, ILL. INST. CLE-ARREST, SEARCH & SEIZURE §§ 18-31, 18-33, 18-34 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as HADDAD]. Although there are many explanations for this phenome-
non, including the weakness of attorneys' research, a "mind set" which assumes that no
court has considered a similar problem contributes to the promulgation of conflicting
precedents. This same attitude or approach helps explain some of the other problems in
Illinois law discussed in this Article.
29. 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other-grounds, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976).
30. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). All of the uncon-
stitutional statutes cited were procedural rather than substantive. They empowered the
officers to engage in the very search which the Supreme Court held violative of the Fourth
Amendment. Arguably there is a difference between reliance upon this type of statute and
1977]
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utilized a broader concept of "reasonableness" and has excluded
evidence without regard to the officers' good faith reliance upon
the apparent authority granted them by statute. Finally, the
Ninth Circuit concluded, perhaps exclusion of evidence seized
following an arrest under an unconstitutional penal provision
would deter legislatures from enacting invalid statutes and ordi-
nances.
Surely responses to the Ninth Circuit's arguments can be
made. Many people, including perhaps a majority of today's
United States Supreme Court, have significant doubts about
whether the demands of judicial integrity require exclusion of
evidence where the police have acted in good faith.3' Some per-
sons argue, in fact, that exclusion of evidence when the police
have acted reasonably and in good faith breeds a disrespect for
the courts.32 Additionally, some of the decisions which the Ninth
Circuit relied upon to establish that good faith is not dispositive
have been denied retrospective application.3 3 Such a denial is a
recognition that conduct which the officer carried out in good
faith before the old law or practice was declared improper ought
not to give rise to the exclusion of evidence .3 Exclusion under
such circumstances clearly will not deter police officers, 3 and the
possibility of deterring legislatures through exclusion of evidence
appears highly speculative.
Thus arguments can be advanced on both sides of the question
of whether an arrest under an unconstitutional law or ordinance
can support a reasonable search. If the issue presents itself again
to an Illinois reviewing court, some thoughtful consideration of
the arguments would be appropriate. Because the question is so
closely tied to the debate over the nature and the purpose of the
exclusionary rule,3" a court's resolution of the question probably
reliance upon a penal provision which later is held to violate the First or the Fourteenth
Amendment.
31. Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3071 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 3073-74 (1976).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
34. Id. at 536-39.
35. Id. at 539.
36. There is a possibility that this narrow issue could be resolved by implication in a
future decision of the United States Supreme Court which declares that the exclusionary
rule should never be utilized when the police have acted in good faith. See the prediction
in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 551-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 26:492
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will reflect its attitude toward the exclusionary rule itself.
3. Apparent Authority in Consent Search Cases
Can a search ever be considered reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment when its sole justification was consent given by a
person who apparently had authority over the property in ques-
tion but who, in fact, had no such authority? The United States
Supreme Court provided no clear answer in its 1964 decision,
Stoner v. California.37 The prosecution argued that a search of a
guest's room conducted pursuant to the consent of a hotel clerk
was reasonable. The Court's response in rejecting the argument
was a classic in ambiguity: "Our decisions make clear that the
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded
by strained applications of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of
'apparent authority.'-'8 Are all doctrines of apparent authority in
consent search cases inherently "unrealistic" and therefore to be
rejected as unreasonable? Or was the Supreme Court merely con-
demning those applications of apparent authority doctrines
which happen to be unrealistic? The United States Supreme
Court had an opportunity in 1974 to clarify the law in this area
but specifically left the question open. 9
In 1968 the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Miller0 estab-
lished the standard to be utilized in Illinois courts: apparent
authority cannot justify a consent search.4 Miller presented as
compelling a factual situation as any prosecutor could hope for
in his efforts to persuade a court to uphold a search conducted
pursuant to the consent of one who had apparent but not actual
authority over property. Police officers in Miller had come to a
home owned by a Mrs. Johnson. A police investigation revealed
that license plates on the vehicle parked in the garage were regis-
tered to Mrs. Johnson. Believing her to own the car, the police
sought and received her permission to search the vehicle. Evi-
dence which was discovered was admitted against Eugene Miller
37. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
38. Id. at 488.
39. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974).
40. 40 I1l.2d 154, 238 N.E.2d 407, cert. denied, 393 U.S, 961 (1968).
41. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 31 Ill.App.3d 576, 333 N.E.2d 41 (4th Dist. 1975); People
v. Johnson, 21 IIl.App.3d 799, 329 N.E.2d 464 (1st Dist. 1975).
19771
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in his trial on abortion charges.2 The appellate court affirmed his
conviction, declaring that the officers had acted reasonably in
searching the vehicle with the permission of the apparent owner. 3
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed upon a determination that
Eugene Miller, not Mrs. Johnson, had owned the vehicle." The
search was declared unreasonable as a matter of law because it
was not authorized by a person having a sufficient interest in the
vehicle. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court read Stoner to condemn
any utilization of apparent authority doctrines in consent search
cases.
The citizen's viewpoint supports the Illinois position that ap-
parent authority cannot validate a search. A person has a privacy
interest in his or her home, car, or other property which no
stranger has a right to invade. If a party who is legally a stranger
to that property cannot enter lawfully upon it or search through
the property, that stranger cannot authorize a police officer to do
so. How can a legal right be derived from someone who himself
has no legal claim? The law should deem unreasonable any search
whose only justification is the consent of one who has no legal
interest in the place searched or the property seized.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Miller did not suggest that there
was another way of reading Stoner. Furthermore, it did not deal
with any of the arguments for or against use of the apparent
authority concept in consent search cases. In omitting to do so,
it avoided complexities faced by other courts and rather effort-
lessly reached a result which is inconsistent with the position
adopted by a number of other well respected courts.45
42. The facts in Miller are stated more fully in the appellate court opinion than in the
supreme court opinion. See note 43 infra.
43. People v. Miller, 82 Ill.App.2d 304, 226 N.E.2d 413 (1st Dist. 1967), rev'd, 40 111. 2d
154, 238 N.E.2d 407, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968).
44. People v. Miller, 40 1Il.2d 154, 238 N.E.2d 407 (1968).
45. See the California decisions cited in note 46 infra. See also United States v. Peter-
son, 524 F.2d 167, 180 n.20 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1975); Hayes v. Cady,
500 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974); United States v. Sells, 496
F.2d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 1974). But see post-Miller Illinois decisions, two of which suggest
that for a consent search to be reasonable the consenting party must have had actual
authority and must have appeared to have authority. People v. Taylor, 31 Ill.App.3d 576,
333 N.E.2d 41 (4th Dist. 1975); People v. Johnson, 28 Ill.App.3d 799, 329 N.E.2d 464 (1st.
Dist. 1975); People v. Miller, 19 Ill.App.3d 161, 310 N.E.2d 808 (4th Dist. 1974). Johnson
might be read to uphold a consent based upon apparent authority. A more likely construc-
[Vol. 26:492
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The California courts, for instance, both before and after
Stoner, had opted for a "realistic" application of the apparent
authority doctrine. They upheld searches in which the police rea-
sonably but erroneously concluded that the consenting person
had authority over the property in question. 6 Justice Roger Tray-
nor was the most eloquent champion of the doctrine. Analyzing
the language of the Fourth Amendment, Traynor argued that the
Constitution prohibits not every tortious interference with prop-
erty rights, but only unreasonable police conduct. In a "realistic"
case of apparent authority, the police, by definition, have acted
reasonably in concluding that they were dealing with someone
having legal authority over the property. During the hearing on
the motion to suppress, the concern should be "discouraging un-
reasonable activity on the part of law enforcement officers" rather
than "enforcing defendant's rights under the law of tres-
pass. . .. "I Faced with similar facts in some future case, good
police officers would behave precisely as did the officers in Miller.
To persons who believe that the justification, if any, for the exclu-
sionary rule is the deterrence of unreasonable police conduct,
exclusion of evidence when the police have acted reasonably is
outrageous. Congratulating an officer for proper behavior and
then suppressing the evidence is intolerable.48 Thus, as has been
suggested earlier, apparent authority questions call for earnest
reflection upon the purpose and application of the exclusionary
rule.49
tion, and one consistent with the supreme court's 1968 Miller decision, is that when the
only available evidence at trial suggests that the consenting party did have authority, the
trial and reviewing courts can conclude that he did have actual authority.
46. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 770, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal.Rptr. 382 (1966);
Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal.Rptr. 552 (1962); People v.
Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955). See also People v. Robinson, 41 Cal.App.3d 658,
116 Cal.Rptr. 455 (1974), and cases cited therein.
47. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 337 n.48.
See also Traynor's opinion in People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955).
48. Two years before Miller, without necessarily adopting this argument for apparent
authority, Professor LaFave stated it with precision in his outstanding article, LaFave,
Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law... Has Not. . .Run Smooth," 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 255, 321.
49. See text accompanying note 36 supra. For a concise modern statement of the argu-
ment in favor of apparent authority based upon recent United States Supreme Court
statements about the exclusionary rule, see United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 180
n.20 (4th Cir. 1975).
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The question is not as simple as advocates of apparent author-
ity would have us believe, however. If we accept apparent author-
ity arguments in a case like Miller, where shall we draw the line?
Consider various circumstances under which claims of apparent
authority might be made:
(1) An officer honestly believes that a hotel clerk can con-
sent to a search of the guest's room (the situation in Stoner);
(2) An officer executes a search warrant which turns out to
have been invalidly issued;5"
(3) An officer conducts a search expressly or arguably au-
thorized by a statute which later is declared violative of the
Fourth Amendment or is construed not to authorize the con-
duct;5"
(4) An officer conducts a search incident to an arrest under
a penal provision which later is held to violate the First Amend-
ment;52
(5) An officer executes an arrest warrant which, unknown to
him, has just been withdrawn; 3
(6) An officer arrests A, reasonably believing him to be B,
for whom a valid arrest warrant is outstanding. The officer then
searches A incident to the mistaken-identity arrest.5
50. Some persons who advocate modification of the exclusionary rule would not apply
it when an invalid search warrant has been issued. The apparent authority argument on
such facts was made in Wolff v. Rice, reported as a companion to Stone v. Powell, 96 S.Ct.
3037 (1976).
51. Like the immigration agents in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973), the Internal Revenue Agents in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 97 S.Ct. 619
(1977), were acting under a statutory scheme which they arguably believed authorized
their conduct. This kind of apparent authority issue is of the type discussed in Powell v.
Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974). See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
52. See notes 16-36 and accompanying text supra.
53. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §107-2(b) (1975) purports to authorize an arrest by an offi-
cer who reasonably believes that a warrant is outstanding. The statute has been chal-
lenged at the trial level on various occasions. The defense argument is that if an invalid
warrant would not sustain the conduct of the officer, see hypothetical in text at note 50
supra, the argument for legality can be no better when no warrant at all purports to
authorize an arrest.
54. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court already have
resolved this type of mistake-of-fact apparent authority argument in favor of the prosecu-
tion. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971); People v. Gwin, 49 Ill.2d 255, 274 N.E.2d
43 (1971). Interestingly, the California Supreme Court used the apparent authority con-
sent search cases to support the conclusion that mistaken identity can be the basis for a
reasonable search incident to arrest. See People v. Hill, 69 Cal.2d 550, 555, 446 P.2d 521,
525, 72 Cal. Rptr. 641, 645 (1968), aff'd, 401 U.S. 797 (1971). Both the consent search and
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As far as the author knows, no one has suggested a unified ap-
proach to problems of apparent authority. Any formulation, at a
minimum, must alleviate the grave concern of those who are wary
of apparent authority doctrines: a government official's ignorance
of constitutional or other legal principles must not be allowed to
diminish a citizen's protection under the Fourth Amendment.
The age-old distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of
law would achieve the desired result. Evidence obtained by a
police officer's honest and reasonable mistake of fact would be
admissible under the doctrine of apparent authority. Evidence
obtained by mistake of law, whether by police officer, magistrate,
or legislature, would not. In example one, above, the officer has
made a mistake of law. Such mistakes of law have been made by
the magistrate in example two, by the legislature or the officer in
example three, and by the legislature in example four. In none of
these instances would the search be deemed reasonable under the
suggested apparent authority doctrine. In examples five and six,
the officer's reasonable mistake of fact would justify the search.
The suggested formulation would permit a result contrary to
Miller yet reconcilable with Stoner.
4. Homicide Scene Searches
Until recently there have not been many opinions considering
Fourth Amendment challenges to the admission of evidence
seized during searches of homicide scenes. One explanation is
that to raise such a challenge ordinarily the defendant must have
an interest in the place searched.5 Another is that before Chimel
the mistaken identity situations involve what the author classifies as a reasonable mistake
of fact.
55. Occasionally standing is derived from an interest in the items seized. See, e.g.,
United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1972). In most of the cases, however, both
victim and accused lived at the place where the slaying occurred. Almost all the cases
involved homicides and at the time of the search the victim was either dead or very gravely
injured. The line of cases under discussion do not concern searches of other crime scenes.
The calculation of reasonableness might well be different if the crime were less serious
than homicide. See text following note 72 infra. From the police perspective, the search
and the processing of the scene of a homicide are practices routinely required, as they are
in the case of few other crimes. The traditional, routine, and distinct nature of the homi-
cide scene searches may explain why until recently so few defense lawyers challenged such
searches. Additionally, when the victim has survived the attack, as an occupant of the
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v. California, " officers who lawfully arrested a suspect in his own
home could search the entire house incident to the arrest. When
Chimel limited such searches to the area "within reach," a new
rationale for such searches was needed if they were to be deemed
lawful. Some courts have invalidated homicide scene searches
except when the facts fit within one of the recognized exceptions
to the warrant requirement, such as consent, plain view, or the
narrowed doctrine of search incident to arrest." Others have up-
held these searches on the notion that the need to prevent de-
struction of evidence permits emergency warrantless searches.
Still others have concluded that homicide scene searches are per
se reasonable."
In the last decade several courts have analyzed thoughtfully
and debated extensively the right of authorities to search the
scene of a very recent homicide. 9 When the Illinois Supreme
Court dealt with this issue, however, in the 1973 case of People
v. King,"0 it took note of none of the conceptual difficulties in
homicide scene searches. In King, a police officer entered the
defendant's bedroom which was next to the doorway where two
bodies had been found. Once in the room, the officer was able to
see "in plain view" a box for a gun. He seized the box and also
searched through various drawers, finding nothing else of eviden-
tiary value. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the entry, search,
home, his or her consent eliminates the necessity for reliance on a crime scene exception
to the warrant requirement.
56. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
57. The author's generalization is based upon his reading of the cases cited in note 59
infra and a few other decisions either following the cited decisions or referred to in the
cited opinions.
58. See cases cited in note 59 infra.
59. Cases upholding crime scene searches include United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113
(2d Cir. 1972); Brown v. Jones, 407 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Tex.), remanded on other grounds,
489 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Brown v. Estelle, 526 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.
1976); Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969);
People v. Wallace, 31 Cal.App.3d 865, 509 P.2d 1121, 107 Cal.Rptr. 659 (1973), and cases
cited therein; State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d
921 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Cases invalidating crime scene searches include Sample v.
Eyman, 469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. Williams, 557 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1976)
(Claudine Longet case); State v. Brothers, 4 Ore.App. 253, 478 P.2d 442 (1970); State v.
Pires, 55 Wis.2d 597, 201 N.W.2d 153 (1972).
60. 54 Ill.2d 291, 296 N.E.2d 731 (1973).
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and seizure without citation of any authority or analysis of the
issue.
Because the officers in King had conducted the search while
still seeking the identity of both the perpetrator and the victim,
it is possible to construe the decision's approval of homicide scene
searches narrowly to cases involving such facts. Utilizing the
King court's own language, one also can argue that the court
approved any "unplanned search in a setting of immediate viol-
ence."'" However, the Illinois Appellate Court has broadly inter-
preted King, apparently approving homicide scene searches with-
out qualification.62 For now, therefore, it is fair to say that in
Illinois, homicide scene searches are deemed to be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Because the issue surely will come
before the Illinois Supreme Court again, 3 the court perhaps will
provide more practical guidance and a more reasoned analysis
than it has in the past.64
The debate between courts which uphold warrantless homicide
scene searches and those which invalidate such searches mirrors
a larger debate over warrantless searches. The broad question is
whether we should accept at face value the United States Su-
preme Court's proclamation that warrantless searches are per-
missible only if they fit under a specially established, well-
61. Id. at 300, 296 N.E.2d at 737 (emphasis added).
62. See People v. Johnson, 32 Ill.App.3d 36, 335 N.E.2d 144 (1975).
63. Nothing breeds discussion of a fine legal point as does the well-publicized trial of a
public figure. Thus the recent success of actress Claudine Longet in suppressing the fruits
of a homicide scene search undoubtedly will give rise to new challenges in Illinois and
elsewhere. See People v. Williams, 557 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1976).
64. People v. Cole, 54 Ill.2d 401, 298 N.E.2d 705 (1973), decided in the same term of
court as King, also posed homicide scene search problems. Cole is different from other
cases mentioned in this section in that authorities knew that the bodies of the victims were
no longer at the scene of the homicides when the police arrived. The nuance could have
posed an interesting question concerning homicide scene searches. Instead, in a case in
which the suspect had been arrested on the roof, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
pre-Chimel search of the dwelling through a tortured extension of the search-incident
doctrine. Cf. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818
(1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); People v. Erickson, 31 Ill.2d 230,
201 N.E.2d 422 (1964); People v. Kalpak, 10 Ill.2d 411, 140 N.E.2d 726 (1957). As to
searches conducted after the date of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the search
incident to arrest doctrine, despite Cole, will not provide justification for most crime scene
searches. Such searches almost always extend to places beyond the reach of the arrestee,
thus exceeding search-incident boundaries set by Chimel.
19771
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
delineated exception. 5 If the well-recognized exception doctrine
is taken literally, the homicide scene search question can be re-
solved easily. There is no "homicide scene" exception. The
United States Supreme Court has never approved or delineated
such a doctrine. Unless the search can be justified on a consent,
search incident to arrest, or plain view theory, routine warrantless
crime scene searches must be invalidated.
Faced with this situation, prosecutors typically have justified
entry in a homicide scene search case on a civil emergency theory:
a victim within the home may be in dire need of medical assis-
tance. Rather than challenging the officers' right to enter, defense
counsel will question the exploratory search. The defense will
demand to know what gave the police the right, without a war-
rant, to search for evidence which might link a suspect to the
homicide, or which might negate a defense such as accident or
suicide. If the prosecution advances an emergency theory, based
upon the need to prevent the destruction of evidence,"0 often the
defense can respond that no emergency existed. The case for ex-
clusion of evidence found in an "emergency" search appears
strongest when a suspected or known perpetrator is already in
custody or otherwise away from the scene; when the victim has
been removed to the hospital or the morgue; when the police, once
having controlled the premises, have left and later re-entered; 7
when the search is extremely expansive; or when the seizure is of
personal papers or other documents. 8 The defense thus argues
that because there was no emergency, there was no excuse for the
failure to obtain a warrant." The defense argument has carried
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30, 34 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
66. It still is debatable whether the probability that evidence will be destroyed is a good
enough reason to justify a warrantless entry into a home. See generally, HADDAD, supra
note 28, §7-11. Assuming that entry has already been made on a civil emergency, entry-
to-arrest, or other theory, the right to search the whole house to prevent the possible
destruction of evidence certainly is not well established. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969), can be read to hold that no such right exists.
67. The fact that several hours may pass before crime technicians arrive belies the
notion that swift action is necessary.
68. The author's generalization is based upon his reading of the cases cited in note 59
supra and a few other decisions either following the cited decisions or referred to in the
cited opinions.
69. More particularly, the defense argues that searches without warrants are violative
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the day in several jurisdictions."
The most thoughtful among the opinions which have upheld
crime scene searches are those which do not stretch the emer-
gency concept in an intellectually dishonest fashion. Instead
these decisions conclude that crime scene searches are reasonable
even absent an emergency.7 The authors of these opinions start
from the premise that the Fourth Amendment requires that
warrantless searches be reasonable, and nothing more. Whether
the crime scene search can be "slotted" into one of the traditional
warrantless search categories is not the ultimate test." The courts
argue that the familiar practice of making a thorough search of
the scene of a recent homicide is inherently reasonable, even
though it may intrude upon the privacy of survivors. Reasonable-
ness under the Fourth Amendment requires a balancing of inter-
ests, and a proper consideration in the calculation is the serious-
ness of the crime which has been committed. The alternative to
a warrantless search of a homicide scene may be no search at all.
Homicide scene searches are by their nature exploratory, so that
the police often would not be able to provide a magistrate with
probable cause to believe that a specifically designated item
would turn up at the scene and would constitute evidence of a
crime .
The Supreme Court in recent years has upheld some searches
under a general notion of reasonableness, taking into account all
the circumstances, even though the facts fit none of the well-
delineated exceptions.7 In practice, the philosophy of Mr. Justice
of the Fourth Amendment unless made under one of the "few specially established and
well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967). See also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The non-emergency search of a crime scene fits into none of the
exceptions.
70. See cases cited in note 59 supra. Nevertheless, even the presence of each of these
factors might not be sufficient to win exclusion in certain jurisdictions.
71. See, e.g., People v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 489 P.2d 44 (1971), vacated sub nom.
Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App.3d 865,
107 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1973). See also State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969), for another
well-reasoned opinion.
72. See People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App.3d 865, 870, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659, 662 (1973).
73. State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203, 211 (Me. 1969), makes the point especially well.
74. The seizure for inspection of a prisoner's clothes many hours after his arrest, ap-
proved in United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), fits under neither the search-
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Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court, that the recognized ex-
ceptions are not exclusive but instead are merely guides to aid
courts in deciding what is reasonable police conduct, may pre-
vail.75
However, if the only guidance courts have is some general no-
tion of reasonableness, crime scene searches inevitably will create
problems. Even if courts are prepared to approve most homicide
scene searches, some searches, such as the reading of a suspect's
diary for evidence which will reveal a motive or negate a claim of
accident, will be so offensive to the sensibilities of many judges
that they will hold illegal the crime scene actions of the officers.
A case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of homicide
scene searches will lead to differing results in various tribunals,
and it will give little guidance to homicide investigators.
Homicide scene search problems are extremely troublesome.
No solution may be entirely satisfactory. Nevertheless, a first
step toward an Illinois resolution must be the recognition by Illi-
nois courts of the complexity of the issues.
5. Entry of Home to Arrest Resident Without Probable Cause
to Believe That He is Within
When the police have probable cause to believe that a suspect
has committed a crime, how certain must they be that the sus-
pect is at home before they can enter with or without an arrest
warrant?7" Must they have probable cause to believe that the
incident exception nor some administrative search theory. Nevertheless it was approved
as reasonable under all the circumstances. For want of an arrest, the inspection of the
suspect's fingernails in Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), could not be considered a
search incident to arrest. Assuming that "disappearing evidence emergency" is not a well
recognized, specially-delineated exception, see note 61 supra, the Court's approval of the
inspection must be viewed as a decision that the inspection was reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances.
75. See People v. Boykin, 39 Ill.2d 617, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968). See also People v. Moore,
35 Ill.2d 399, 220 N.E.2d 443 (1966), in which Justice Schaefer commented that the chance
boundaries of decided cases should not be dispositive of a question of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment.
76. The question whether the police must have an arrest warrant to justify an entry to
arrest is treated in Part II of this Article. That question is distinct from the probable cause
question now under discussion. Even if an officer has obtained an arrest warrant, he still
cannot enter the suspect's home without any regard to the likelihood that the suspect is
at home.
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suspect is at home, or will a lesser quantum of data suffice? The
issue typically arises when although the suspect was not found at
home, the police seized evidence following entry. The prosecutor
argues that entry was justified to arrest and that, once inside,
under plain view principles, the police lawfully seized evidence
which they came upon while looking in a place where the suspect
could have been hiding. The argument is valid if the premise is
correct." Thus it becomes necessary to consider the reasonable-
ness of an entry to arrest without certain knowledge that the
suspect is within.
Although the Illinois courts have not quantified the required
degree of probability by using an abstract phrase such as
"reasonable suspicion," "clear indication," or "probable cause,"
the Illinois decisions provide a discernible standard: unless the
police know that the suspect is not within, they may enter to
arrest." The Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Sprovierill
announced the Illinois rule without citing a single authority even
though it had not previously considered the question. The court
dismissed the issue with only a few sentences.
Sprovieri had come upon the scene more than an hour after the
police had discovered Leslie Vana's body. Sprovieri viewed the
deceased, denied knowing him, and then left. A subsequent inves-
tigation showed that Sprovieri knew Vana as a rival for the affec-
tions of Judith Blaha. Sprovieri had threatened violence against
both Vana and Blaha if their relationship continued. The police
also learned that Blaha had planned to leave town and that she
and a man fitting Sprovieri's description had been seen leaving
her apartment, red suitcase in hand, a few hours after the discov-
ery of Vana's body."' More than twenty hours after the discovery,
77. See, e.g., People v. Morales, 48 Ill.2d 396, 271 N.E.2d 33 (1971); People v. Sprovieri,
43 ll.2d 223, 252 N.E.2d 531 (1969); People v. Barbee, 35 Ill.2d 407,220 N.E.2d 401 (1966);
People v. Carter, 132 Ill.App.2d 572, 270 N.E.2d 603 (1st Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
962 (1972). See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1967).
78. People v. Bussie, 41 Ill.2d 323, 243 N.E.2d 196 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 819
(1969), makes the obvious observation that the entry-to-arrest theory is not viable when
the police know that the suspect is not at home.
79. 43 Ill.2d 223, 252 N.E.2d 531 (1969). People v. Barbee, 35 Ill.2d 407, 220 N.E.2d 401
(1966), contains similar facts, but it yielded no rule about the question of data necessary
to justify entry.
80. 43 Ill.2d at 224-25, 252 N.E.2d at 532.
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the police arrived at Sprovieri's home and were told by neighbors
that he had not been seen that day. Looking through a window,
they observed a piece of red luggage and a woman's garment.
After no one responded to their knocks, the officers entered,
looked around, and found no one. They then approached Sprovi-
eri's garage and through a small opening spotted a car fitting the
description of one owned by Blaha. When the police entered the
garage, they found no one within. In plain view, however, they
saw and seized a bicycle chain, which later was alleged to have
been the murder weapon."' The trial judge prohibited use of the
chain as evidence. The appellate court reversed, and the supreme
court upheld the appellate court's decision.2
The Illinois high court's opinion yielded a black-letter rule:
"Normal precautionary measures require that the police elimi-
nate all hiding places before moving on." 3 This principle is now
controlling law in Illinois courts. It has been applied in later cases
without a careful assessment of the probability that the suspect
might have been found at home, and without a comparison to the
degree of probability present in the Sprovieri case. 4 When the
Illinois Supreme Court next considered the issue in People v.
Morales5 it seemed to say that as long as the police had grounds
for arresting the suspect, they had a right and a duty to enter his
garage to see if he was there. Thus the Illinois rule is that the
police may enter the suspect's home and garage unless they know
that he is absent.
This principle is at odds with the belief widely held by com-
81. Id. at 227, 252 N.E.2d at 532-33. Whether the chain was the murder weapon was
never established. After remand and before trial, Sprovieri met a fate similar to Leslie
Vana's.
82. People v. Sprovieri, 95 Ill.App.2d 10, 238 N.E.2d 115 (1st Dist. 1968), aff'd, 43 Ill.2d
223, 252 N.E.2d 531 (1969).
83. Id. at 225, 252 N.E.2d at 534. This declaration echoed the appellate court's observa-
tion in Sprovieri that "rudimentary police procedure dictates that a suspect's residence
be eliminated as a possible hiding place before a search is conducted elsewhere." 95 Ill.
App.2d at 14, 238 N.E.2d at 118.
84. See People v. Morales, 48 Ill.2d 396, 271 N.E.2d 33 (1971); People v. Carter, 132
Ill.App.2d 572, 270 N.E.2d 603 (1st Dist. 1971). Later decisions have ignored the fact that
the Sprovieri court figured into the Fourth Amendment calculation of reasonableness a
civil emergency factor, namely the possibility that Judith Blaha might have lain in the
house or garage in dire need of medical assistance.
85. People v. Morales, 48 Ill.2d 396, 271 N.E.2d 33 (1971).
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mentators and by other courts that the police can enter a sus-
pect's dwelling for arrest purposes only if they have probable
cause to believe that the suspect is within. 6 The United States
Supreme Court has not considered the issue of probable cause,
but in discussing entries to arrest, it also has referred to the
existence of probable cause to believe that the suspect was
within. 7 The issue is not an easy one. Entry into a home, even
for arrest purposes, is a search."8 In most other contexts, to justify
a search we require probable cause to believe that the search will
prove fruitful. For instance, issuance of a valid search warrant
requires a probability that the specified evidence will turn up at
the place named in the warrant.8 For this purpose, no distinction
is drawn between the search of the property of a probable offender
and the search of the property of a third person. The only ques-
tion is whether the search probably will yield criminal evidence."
There is logic, however, to the Illinois position that police offi-
cers seeking a suspect, whether in hot pursuit or not, might well
86. United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974), is a leading decision in this
regard. It equates the sanctity of a person's locked office, "at least at night," with entry
into a person's dwelling. Id. at 1134. It then holds that an officer must have probable cause
to believe that the person he is attempting to arrest is within the building before the officer
can enter. Id. at 1136. See also Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945);
United States v. Watson, 307 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1969); United States v. Sims, 231 F.
Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1964); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REv. 349, 360 (1974); Comment, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest
Entries, 23 STAN. L. REv. 995, 997 (1971). See generally Part II infra.
87. When Mr. Justice Harlan spoke in Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500
(1958), of the "grave constitutional question" posed by a warrantless forceful nighttime
entry into a dwelling to arrest a suspect, he included in his hypothetical, as if it were
obviously necessary, the supposition that the suspect was "reasonably believed within."
See text at notes 88-94 infra for a discussion of the warrant requirement in the arrest-entry
situation. In other cases in which warrantless entries for arrest purposes have been upheld,
the police have had, if not positive knowledge, at least a substantial probability to believe
that the suspect was within. See United States v. Santana, 96 S.Ct. 2406 (1976); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
88. See United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886, 888-900 (6th Cir. 1974); Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 206 (4th Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717, 721
(Mass. 1975). See generally Rotenberg & Tanzer, Searching for the Person to be Seized,
35 OHIo ST. L.J. 56 (1974).
89. See, e.g., United States v. DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1016 (1975); United States v. Spach, 518 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1975); People v. Francisco, 44
l.2d 373, 255 N.E.2d 413 (1970); People v. Billerbeck, 323 Ill. 48, 153 N.E. 586 (1926).
90. See People v. Simmons, 330 Ill. 494, 161 N.E. 716 (1928); People v. Daugherty, 324
Ill. 160, 154 N.E.2d 907 (1927).
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be unreasonably inconvenienced by restrictions against entering
the suspect's home. The suspect's home would be a sanctuary if
he could avoid being seen or heard. Wasteful police surveillance
might be mandated, detracting from more fruitful investigative
efforts. The precedent for forbidding entry without probable
cause to believe that the suspect is within is not as weighty as it
seems because most of the cases involve warrantless entries into
the home of a third person, to whom the suspect is legally a
stranger." The argument is plausible that the invasion of the
privacy of an innocent third party needs more justification than
the invasion of the privacy of one whom there is probable cause
to arrest.2 The relevant requirement of the Fourth Amendment
for judging the validity of a warrantless search is "reasonable-
ness," not "probable cause." If full probable cause is demanded
for issuance of a valid search warrant, it is only because the
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment uses the phrase "prob-
able cause" and governs the issuance of search warrants. That
clause has no application to warrantless searches. Elsewhere,
in emergency situations, warrantless searches have been per-
mitted on reasonable grounds falling short of probable cause. 3
The Sprovieri issue deserves more studied consideration than
it has so far received in Illinois. Its importance would not dimin-
ish greatly even if our courts mandated more frequent use of
arrest warrants because the entry-probable cause issue must be
faced even when the police have obtained an arrest warrant. 4
91. See, e.g., Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976); Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974);
Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
S.Ct. 909 (1975); United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966);
Palmer v. United States, 192 A.2d 801 (D.C. App. 1963).
92. In many of the cases cited in note 91 supra the courts have been careful to point
out that the home entered was not the suspect's, suggesting that a different issue would
be presented if it had been.
93. See, e.g., People v. DeVito, 77 Misc.2d 463, 353 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1974); People v.
Superior Court, 6 Cal.App.3d 379, 85 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1970). The theory is that in a now-
or-never emergency, action may be reasonable to prevent a possible disaster or the de-
struction of evidence even when the data falls short of probable cause.
94. See note 76 supra.
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II. WARRANTLESS ENTRIES TO EFFECT NON-EMERGENCY ARRESTS
Must authorities obtain an arrest warrant before making a non-
consensual entry into a home to arrest a suspect under non-
emergency circumstances? Prior to 1970, this question received
little attention because of the general assumption that the right
to arrest necessarily included the right to enter to effect the ar-
rest. In 1970 the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Johnson"
summarily adhered to the traditional view that warrantless en-
tries are reasonable per se even in non-emergencies. That same
year, the United States Court of Appeals, in Dorman v. United
States," provided a more thoughtful analysis and established a
balancing approach that has gained wide acceptance. 7 In 1976,
the Supreme Court examined a related issue in United States v.
Watson," and employed an historical approach which, if used to
resolve the warrantless entry to arrest question, would uphold the
Illinois position. Whether Illinois should retain its present stance
on warrantless entries to arrest merits consideration.
1. The Law Before 1970
Challenges to warrantless entries to arrest vere rare before
1970. Consistent with the view of early writers, it was widely
assumed that a necessary adjunct to the right to arrest" was the
power to enter a home, by force if necessary, to effect the arrest."10
95. 45 Il1. 2d 283, 259 N.E.2d 57, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1970). The author argued
on behalf of Johnson.
96. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc).
97. Since 1970 state and federal courts have considered the question. See notes 119-24
and accompanying text infra. The United States Supreme Court has made frequent refer-
ence to the issue. See text accompanying notes 123-41 infra. Law review writers have
wrestled with the problem. See, e.g., Watson & Ramey, The Balance of Interests in Non-
Exigent Felony Arrests, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 838 (1976); Note, Warrantless Arrests By
Police Survive a Constitutional Challenge, 14 AM. CiuM. L. Rav. 193, 207-14 (1976); Com-
ment, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23 STAN. L. Rav. 995
(1971). The Stanford comment appeared in the May 1971 issue, but did not mention
Dorman, which had been decided on April 15, 1970. Publication of Dorman in the West
system was delayed substantially, but the case became widely known and was frequently
cited after it appeared in 7 Crim. L. Rptr. 2107 (1970).
98. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
99. As long as probable cause exists, police officers without a warrant validly can arrest
felons and certain misdemeanants.
100. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), for an account of the relevant
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To say that a warrantless arrest was proper also meant that a
warrantless entry for arrest purposes was permissible, at least
when the suspect was reasonably believed to be within.''
People v. Scott, 02 a 1965 Illinois Appellate Court opinion, typi-
fied the occasional case in which a defendant challenged the ab-
sence of an arrest warrant. On July 3, 1963, probable cause devel-
oped to arrest Walter Scott for a burglary which had been com-
mitted on June 24, 1963. Without obtaining a warrant, Chicago
police officers went to the apartment where Scott had been stay-
ing. When they arrived there at 1 P.M., they were told that Scott
was at work a short distance away. The officers awaited his re-
turn. According to the defense version, which apparently was
uncontested, "three detectives spent the next fourteen hours
drinking coffee in Scott's apartment and resting in front of the
building in which Scott lived. At no time during this protracted
period did any of the three go to Scott's place of employment. Nor
did any of them make an attempt to obtain a warrant for Walter
Scott's arrest."'0 3 The officers arrested the suspect at 3 A.M. after
Scott returned to his apartment. The appellate court rejected the
history. The common law warrantless arrest power extended to misdemeanors committed
in the officer's presence. In Illinois the warrantless arrest power has been expanded to
include all misdemeanors. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§107-2(b), 102-15 (1975). See also
People v. Edge, 406 11. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950); People v. Hill, 28 Ill.App.3d 719, 329
N.E.2d 515 (1975). The United States Supreme Court has never passed upon a Fourth
Amendment challenge to such an expansion of the common law doctrine of warrantless
arrests. Some state courts have invalidated statutes which provided for warrantless arrests
for all misdemeanors. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 455 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
For treatment of the views of the early writers, see Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d
717, 726-27 (Mass. 1976) (Quirico, J., dissenting). See also E. FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST §121
(1967); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L.REv. 541, 550-52 (1924); Note,
Warrantless Arrests Survive a Constitutional Challenge, 14 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 193, 210-
11 (1976). Justice Marshall's feeling that United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976),
effectively resolved the question now under discussion apparently was based upon a belief
that the common law drew no distinction between warrantless arrests and warrantless
entries to arrest. See 423 U.S. at 453-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also text accompa-
nying note 155 infra.
101. Id. The requirement of a probability that the suspect is within is a separate
issue which can arise even when an arrest warrant has been secured. See text accom-
panying notes 76-93 supra.
102. 63 II1. App.2d 232, 211 N.E.2d 418 (1st Dist. 1965).
103. Id. at 244, 211 N.E.2d at 423. The quoted material appeared in the opinion and
was apparently taken verbatim from appellant Scott's brief.
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Fourth Amendment challenge to the warrantless arrest. In so
doing it did not indicate clearly whether the arrest had occurred
in the apartment, and, if so, whether entry had been by consent.
The only question treated was the legality of a warrantless, non-
emergency arrest, an issue which the Illinois Supreme Court al-
ready had settled. 04 The discussion ended without any separate
consideration of the warrantless entry into Scott's apartment.
2. 1970 and Beyond: Illinois Adheres to the Traditional Rule
People v. Johnson,'5 decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois
in 1970, was apparently the first case in which an Illinois review-
ing court confronted the argument that without a warrant or
consent the police have no right to enter a home in non-
emergency circumstances to effect an otherwise valid arrest.'"1
For the first time, focus was upon the warrantless entry, not just
upon the warrantless arrest. The Chicago police had probable
cause to arrest Rudolph Johnson for a series of armed robberies
committed between October 1966 and early June 1967.01 At 5:30
P.M. on July 6, 1967, without a warrant, four officers went to
Johnson's second-floor apartment where they found no one home.
When Johnson returned at 8:30 P.M., they permitted him to enter
unmolested and then knocked. When Johnson opened the door,
the police announced their office and, without consent, stepped
across the threshold and immediately arrested Johnson.' °s They
104. See, e.g., People v. Braden, 34 Ill.2d 516, 216 N.E.2d 808 (1966); People v. Jones,
31 Ill.2d 240, 201 N.E.2d 402 (1964).
105. 45 l.2d 283, 259 N.E.2d 57 (1970).
106. At least the court's opinion was the first Illinois decision to distinguish the war-
rantless entry issue from the more general question of warrantless arrests.
107. A stuttering man had taken purses from women in a series of neighborhood robber-
ies. One witness recognized the fleeing robber to be a resident of her building. The robber
had been seen disappearing in the vicinity of the same building. On June 4, 1967 the
witness supplied the police with Rudolph Johnson's name. By July 5, 1967, at the latest,
the police confirmed that Johnson lived in the building, fit a composite description of the
suspect, and stuttered when he spoke. Indeed the police apparently knew all this some-
time in June. Record at 97-99, 112. As the court's opinion vaguely hints, the delay in
arresting Johnson may have resulted from a police desire to keep Johnson's building under
surveillance in the hope of catching the robber either in the commission of a robbery or
in flight following a crime. 45 Ill.2d at 285, 259 N.E.2d at 59. Other facts stated in this
note and in the accompanying text, if not found in the opinion, appear in the record at
104-07.
108. 45 Ill.2d at 285, 259 N.E.2d at 59.
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then conducted a pre-Chimel search incident to arrest, looking
through various rooms while detaining Johnson elsewhere in the
apartment. In a bedroom closet they found property which be-
longed to some of the robbery victims.'
The Illinois Supreme Court noted the defendant's assertion
"that since the officers entered the premises without an arrest
warrant, and without defendant's consent, there was no authority
for the entry.""' The court rejected defendant's argument that "a
warrantless entry is permissible only in hot pursuit or in any
emergency when it is impractical to obtain a warrant.""' Despite
the state's concession that entry was not under the authority of a
warrant or of consent, the court ruled that entry was lawful."'
In explaining why Johnson's Fourth Amendment claim was
incorrect, the court engaged in very little Fourth Amendment
analysis. Much of the single paragraph in which it discussed the
argument was devoted to statutory construction. The court deter-
mined that Illinois statutes authorized warrantless entries to ar-
rest in non-emergency circumstances even though those laws were
not as explicit on this point as were the statutes of some other
jurisdictions."' The court reiterated what the defendant appar-
ently had conceded: the police had probable cause to arrest before
they entered Johnson's apartment. This was not a case in which
the police gained probable cause data only after entering a resi-
dence."' Finally, the court cited several cases, including Ker v.
California, "' in which the right to make a warrantless entry was
not litigated, but rather the method of the entry was at issue."6
109. Id.
110. Id. at 287, 259 N.E.2d at 60.
111. Id. at 287-88, 259 N.E.2d at 60.
112. Id. at 287, 259 N.E.2d at 60.
113. The statutes in question permitted warrantless arrests and allowed the use of force
when necessary to effect entry for the purpose of arrest. They did not expressly speak of
the right to enter to arrest. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§107-2(b), 107-5(d) (1975). The
statutes of some other jurisdictions expressly authorize entry into a building to arrest a
suspect who is reasonably believed to be within. See Note, Warrantless Arrests by Police
Survive a Constitutional Challenge, 14 AM. CalM. L. Rlv. 193, 211 n.121 (1976).
114. 45 Ill.2d at 288, 259 N.E.2d at 60.
115. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
116. These cases involved questions of force, trickery, and absence of notice. It was this
type of question, rather than the right to enter, which had been at issue at common law.
See Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L.REv. 541, 550-52 (1924), and Note,
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Aided by hindsight, a critical reader might conclude that
Johnson is not a very sophisticated opinion. The Illinois high
court discussed none of the arguments which would persuade
other courts in subsequent cases and cited no authority which was
directly on point. From a 1970 perspective, however, the decision
is difficult to criticize. The conclusion reached merely upheld a
principle which was widely accepted as the prevailing common
law view."7 The Illinois Supreme Court had no special reason to
believe that the issue would become one of the most important
questions in subsequent Fourth Amendment litigation. Nor did
the court have any way of knowing that the result it reached in
Johnson would be rejected almost universally by courts of other
jurisdictions in their subsequent decisions."8
Whether Johnson was decided wisely or not, it became control-
ling law in Illinois. No Illinois Supreme Court since Johnson has
reconsidered the question. Thus when the First Appellate District
considered a challenge to a warrantless entry in 1974, its task was
simple. Citing Johnson, the court stated that it was unnecessary
to decide whether the entry was by consent despite a claim that
no emergency had been present. "We deem it now well settled
in Illinois that the legality of arrests is to be tested by the pres-
ence or absence of probable cause and not the presence or absence
of a warrant.""'
For the most part, other post-Johnson decisions in Illinois fit a
pre-1970 mold. Although they hold that the police were not re-
quired to secure a warrant, these opinions do not always focus
Warrantless Arrests By Police Survive a Constitutional Challenge, 14 AM. CRiM. L.Rxv.
193, 210-11 (1976).
117. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
118. See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970); People v. Ramey, 16
Cal.3d 269, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 335 (1976); Common-
wealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1975).
Dorman was decided during the two month period in which Johnson awaited decision
on the Illinois Supreme Court's advisement docket. Although records are incomplete and
memories have faded, appellant apparently cited an earlier slip sheet opinion in Dorman
(which opinion was later withdrawn in favor of the en banc opinion) in a Memorandum
of Additional Authority filed with the Illinois Supreme Court. The final April 15, 1970
Dorman opinion was not argued to the Illinois Supreme Court in any meaningful fashion,
if at all. For this reason, Johnson may be considered a pre-Dorman opinion even though
it was decided a few weeks after Dorman.
119. People v. Weathers, 18 Ill.App.3d 338, 343, 309 N.E.2d 795, 799 (1st Dist. 1974).
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
upon the warrantless entries preceding the arrests. 20 In some
cases it is not clear whether the warrantless entry was justified
by the consent of an occupant. This is understandable because
under Johnson consent is irrelevant. Three other Illinois deci-
sions, one in a holding and two in dictum, do indicate that some-
times a warrant may be necessary to justify an entry to arrest.',
However, because these opinions make no reference to Johnson,
they must be considered aberrations in Illinois law resulting from
faulty legal research.'22 Until the Supreme Court of Illinois says
otherwise, or until the United States Supreme Court mandates
a different conclusion, the Johnson rule governs Illinois practice:
police may make warrantless, non-consensual entries to arrest
suspects upon probable cause even in the absence of emergency
circumstances.
3. The Balancing Approach: Dorman v. United States
In 1970 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, through dictum in Dorman v. United States, " declared that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless entry of a home
to arrest a suspect under non-emergency circumstances. Al-
though it was not the very first opinion to so indicate,'24 Dorman
has assumed the role of a seminal decision. As one court recently
noted, 5 almost every subsequent decision discussing Dorman has
either explicitly accepted its basic proposition or else has as-
sumed the truth of that proposition. 6
120. See, e.g., In re Williams, 30 Ill.App.3d 1025, 333 N.E.2d 674 (4th Dist. 1975);
People v. Franklin, 22 Ill.App.3d 775, 317 N.E.2d 611 (1st Dist. 1974).
121. People v. Mitchell, 35 Ill.App.3d 151, 341 N.E.2d 153 (1st Dist. 1975), contained a
careless dictum which correctly stated that the United States Supreme Court had left the
issue open, without mentioning that the Illinois Supreme Court had resolved the issue in
Johnson. People v. Wolgemuth, 356 N.E.2d 1139 (3d Dist. 1976), motion for leave to
appeal granted (Mar. 31, 1977), cited the Mitchell dictum and also overlooked Johnson.
Mitchell followed Dorman and invalidated a warrantless non-emergency entry. People v.
Spence, 357 N.E.2d 1245 (lst Dist. 1976), also cited Mitchell and Dorman without men-
tioning Johnson. Like Mitchell, it upheld the warrantless entry after finding exigent
circumstances sufficient to justify entry without a warrant.
122. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
123. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(en banc).
124. In Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (1958), the same circuit which later
decided Dorman had invalidated an entry on that very ground.
125. Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717, 723-24 (Mass. 1975).
126. The most complete list of cases is found in Commonwealth v. Forde, id. at 724.
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On December 2, 1966, shortly after 6 P.M., four men robbed
several persons in a District of Columbia clothing store. By 8:30
P.M. the police had probable cause to arrest Harold Dorman,'"
and so they contacted an Assistant United States Attorney to
obtain assistance in securing an arrest warrant. The prosecutor
advised the officers that although no magistrate was available to
issue a warrant, the officers could lawfully arrest Dorman on a
felony charge without a warrant.128 The police arrived at Dor-
man's home at 10:20 P.M., Dorman's mother answered the door
and, in response to police inquiry, indicated that her son was not
home. When the police heard a noise,' they entered without
consent and soon thereafter looked into a closet, where they saw
and seized evidence of the robbery. At trial, Harold Dorman, who
had not been home at the time, challenged the warrantless entry
and argued for the suppression of the evidence.
Dorman's first premise is that a non-consensual entry into a
home is a search even if its ultimate purpose is the arrest of an
occupant.'T 3 This proposition is easy to accept because an uncon-
sented entry of a home is the type of invasion of privacy with
which the Fourth Amendment is concerned.'3' Dorman's second
premise is well grounded in recent United States Supreme Court
opinions: warrantless seraches are permissible only under spe-
cially established well-delineated exceptions.'32 The third and
For a more recent decision see People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.3d 269, 545 P.2d 1333, 127
Cal.Rptr. 629 (1976). See also Note, Warrantless Arrests Survive a Constitutional
Challenge, 14 AM. CRIM. L.REv. 193, 207-08 nn.104, 108 (1976).
127. After changing into a blue sharkskin suit, Dorman left behind in the men's shop
his corduroy trousers, which contained probation papers bearing his name and address.
Police quickly obtained Dorman's photograph from their files, and witnesses identified
Dorman from this photo.
128. 435 F.2d at 388.
129. The noise had been made by a male friend of Mrs. Dorman.
130. 435 F.2d at 390. For other authorities supporting this proposition, see Morrison v.
United States, 262 F.2d 449, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 F.2d 717,
722 (Mass. 1975); see note 88 and accompanying text supra.
131. The only Supreme Court suggestion that a government agent's non-consensual
entry into a home under some circumstances would not be a Fourth Amendment activity
is found in dictum in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1970). The general view, as
Dorman states, is that freedom from intrusion into the home is the "archetype of the
privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment." 435 F.2d at 389.
132. In support of this proposition, the Dorman court asserted that although much has
been written about warrantless arrests, little attention has focused upon entry into a
dwelling to effect an arrest. 435 F.2d at 388-89.
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critical premise is that entry into a home to arrest a suspect upon
probable cause is not one of the well established exceptions.
133
The Dorman court, rejecting a per se rule of reasonableness,
decided that warrantless entries to arrest are proper only under
necessitous circumstances. The court, in essence, constructed a
balancing formula to determine when such circumstances are
present. 134 As under any such Fourth Amendment calculus, sev-
eral factors must be considered: the intensity of the intrusion, the
gravity of the situation, the necessity for quick action and the
"costs" of delay, and the probability that the intrusion will bear
fruit. 35 The Dorman court, mindful of these factors, deemed rele-
vant (1) the relative peacefulness of the entry, (2) the time of day
or night when the entry is made, (3) the seriousness of the crime,
(4) the probability that the suspect is armed, (5) the danger of
flight, (6) the delay which would be occasioned by application for
a warrant, (7) the probability, beyond the minimum requirement
of a probable cause, that the suspect is guilty, and (8) the proba-
bility that the suspect is within the home which is to be entered. 36
Applying these principles, the court upheld the warrantless entry
into Harold Dorman's home.
133. The court also noted that in 1958 dictum Justice Harlan had suggested that war-
rantless entries to arrest posed a grave, unresolved Fourth Amendment question. The
Dorman opinion overlooks the fact that the same historical support for warrantless arrests
also supports warrantless entries to arrest. See text at notes 99-101 supra. The opinion
also ignores the fact that in the 1958 case Justice Clark had responded to Justice Harlan
by asserting that it was well established that the police without a warrant could enter a
home, by force if necessary, to effect an arrest of a suspect who was reasonably believed
to be within.
In Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 503 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting), Justice Clark
cited opinions which assumed that warrantless entries could be made to effect otherwise
valid arrests. He also cited writers who agreed that such entries were permissible at
common law and continued to be so under reported state decisions. The views of those
writers were consonant with the views reflected in the authorities cited in note 100 supra.
134. The court did not specifically use the term "balancing formula," nor did it spell
out general criteria for use in any such formula, as has the author.
135. Compare the factors considered in warrantless entries to arrest with the criteria
utilized to determine whether the circumstances surrounding apparent civil emergency
are sufficient to justify a warrantless entry. Usually the determination of the reasonable-
ness of an emergency entry to preserve life and health requires an assessment of (1) the
substantial probability that someone's safety is seriously endangered and (2) the probabil-
ity that the entry may prove helpful. See HADDAD at §§7-3, 7-7 note 28 supra. People v.
Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1976).
136. The author has re-numbered and grouped the Dorman criteria so that they follow
the pattern of the generalized balancing formula referred to in the text at note 135.
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Those courts which have followed Dorman have accepted the
conclusion that warrantless entries to arrest are permissible only
under special circumstances.'37 Most of them also have adopted
the Dorman balancing formula or criteria for evaluating a war-
rantless entry to arrest. Moreover, the Dorman dictum has be-
come a holding in many jurisdictions in that courts have used the
Dorman standards to invalidate warrantless entries made under
non-exigent circumstances. 3 1
One cannot easily challenge the notion that determining the
reasonableness of a search requires a balancing of the legitimate
interests of law enforcement against the valued privacy and lib-
erty of the citizenry. Perhaps for this reason, decisions following
Dorman have acquiesced readily in that opinion's basic theme:
unless necessitous circumstances make a warrantless entry essen-
tial, a neutral judicial officer must determine whether sufficient
cause exists to justify an intrusion against liberty or privacy.' 39
Individuals can quarrel about what circumstances should be
enough to justify a warrantless entry, but there must be some
situations in which delaying an entry in order to secure a warrant
would be nothing more serious to law enforcement than a petty
inconvenience. Under a balancing formula, therefore, the general
approach of Dorman, if not its details, is correct and the per se
rule of People v. Johnson' ° is wrong. Nevertheless, there is a
different approach to the issue, utilized in a recent United States
Supreme Court decision,' which could foreshadow a triumph of
the Illinois Supreme Court's position in Johnson over the Court
of Appeal's position in Dorman.
137. See cases cited at note 126 supra.
138. In Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1975), for instance, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts invalidated a nighttime entry which had been
made to arrest occupants of an apartment on drug charges. The court found it impossible
to "find one's way around" a delay of three hours during which no effort had been made
to secure an arrest warrant. Id. at 723. In People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.2d 269, 545 P.2d 1333,
127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976), the California Supreme Court held violative of the Fourth
Amendment a non-emergency daytime warrantless entry to arrest made when a magis-
trate was readily available to consider a warrant application. Both Forde and Ramey
emphasized that the authorities by their own delay demonstrated that no emergency
existed.
139. 435 F.2d at 390.
140. 45 Ill.2d 283, 259 N.E.2d 57 (1970).
141. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). See text accompanying notes 142-
52 infra.
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4. The Historical Approach: United States v. Watson
In United States v. Watson,' the Supreme Court held that
officers, even under non-emergency circumstances, may effect a
warrantless arrest of a suspected felon in a public place upon
probable cause. The question of a warrantless entry of a home for
purposes of arrest was not resolved in Watson any more than it
had been in earlier Supreme Court decisions."' Still, the histori-
cal approach utilized in resolving the warrantless arrest question
in Watson could be of great significance to the warrantless entry
dispute.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that a warrantless arrest was illegal
absent emergency circumstances. The Court of Appeals declared
that Watson's illegal arrest had fatally tainted his subsequent
consent to a search of his vehicle."' On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court considered the merits of the claim that the Fourth
Amendment mandates the use of a warrant in non-emergency
circumstances even if the arrest is made in a public place."' Rest-
142. Id.
143. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 n.13 (1975); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 365 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-80 (1971); id. at 492
(Harlan, J., concurring in part); id. at 510-12, 521 (White, J., dissenting); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958); id. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting). Although in Watson
the majority did not expressly deny that its opinion reached the issue of warrantless
entries to arrest, two concurring opinions made such a disclaimer. Id. at 423-33 (Powell,
J., concurring); id. at 433 (Stewart, J., concurring).
144. United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
145. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court treated the case as if there were no
particular justification for the federal officers' "failure" to obtain an arrest warrant. In
Watson the police had probable cause to arrest the suspect for six days before the actual
arrest. The "failure" to get a warrant, however, in the author's mind, is readily explain-
able. An arrest warrant signifies the beginning of a prosecution, and the federal authorities
did not have a case worthy of prosecution until the day of the arrest. In essence all they
had was the word of a reliable informant that the source of a stolen credit card, which
the informant turned over to the police, was Henry Watson. No respectable federal prose-
cutor would approve the initiation of a prosecution on so little evidence. It would be the
informant's word against the defendant's in such a prosecution, and the rules of evidence
would even prevent the jury from learning of the informant's past reliability. The federal
officers in Watson on the day of the arrest did not move in until the informant signalled
that Watson presently possessed additional contraband. Subsequently the prosecutor did
charge both the earlier offense and the one which occurred on the day of the arrest.
However, the jury acquitted on the earlier offense despite hearing evidence about the day
of the arrest which provided some corroboration for the informant's account of the earlier
offense. 504 F.2d at 850.
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ing its opinion largely upon history, the Court noted that warrant-
less felony arrests were permitted at common law even in non-
emergencies. Federal and state statutes, dating back as far as
the Fourth Amendment itself, have approved such warrantless
arrests. 4 ' The United States Supreme Court for decades acqui-
esced in the assumption that warrantless felony arrests are
lawful, without suggesting a distinction between emergency and
non-emergency arrests. 4 ' Thus, the majority opinion, in utilizing
an historical approach, clearly did not adopt the Dorman
balancing process. 4 '
Justice Marshall, dissenting, noted that the majority's ap-
proach could answer the question whether under non-emergency
circumstances a warrant is required to justify entry into a home
for the purpose of arrest. 4 ' Marshall argued that balancing the
liberties of citizens with the legitimate needs of law enforcement
was essential to any interpretation of the reasonableness require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment. 5 ' Under such an approach, the
warrantless-entry-to-arrest issue could be decided differently
from the question of a warrantless arrest in a public place. The
added intrusion embodied in a non-consensual entry into a sus-
pect's home could tip the balance in favor of a warrant require-
ment under non-emergency circumstances.
A court following the majority approach in Watson could up-
hold a warrantless non-emergency entry to arrest with historical
support. The sources which approve warrantless arrests also ap-
prove warrantless entries to arrest. 5' Thus, a well-established
exception does exist in the case of entries upon probable cause to
146. 423 U.S. at 418-22.
147. Id. at 416-17.
148. The Court's only concern for practicalities is reflected in its claim that an "exigent
circumstances" test for warrantless arrests would spawn substantial litigation. While this
may be of some concern, one would hardly expect such an argument, by itself, to carry
the day. The dissent takes Justice White to task for this argument. Id. at 452 n.19 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 444-45.
151. Id. at 453-54. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra. Justice Marshall did not
challenge the proposition that warrantless felony arrests were permissible at common law,
whether made in a public place or elsewhere. Instead he argued that historically felonies
were only the most serious offenses at common law, so that history does not support
warrantless arrests for all crimes which we call felonies today. Id. at 438-43.
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make an otherwise valid arrest. Indeed, judges who have ex-
pressed the belief that such entries are per se reasonable typically
have utilized an historical approach to the question.'
5. The Issue in Illinois After Dorman and Watson
The question of warrantless entries to arrest merits more con-
sideration than was evidenced by the single paragraph devoted to
it in the Illinois Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Johnson. 5 The
wisdom of the Illinois per se rule of reasonableness has been called
into question by numerous tribunals including the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, and the California Supreme Court.' Yet, the
Illinois Supreme Court could defend the rule announced in
Johnson using an historical approach as outlined in Watson and
other decisions.
There are intermediate positions, of course. For instance, the
court could accept Dorman's basic premise without undermining
the results reached in Johnson. Recall that in Johnson the police
did not go from room to room in search of the suspect, but merely
stepped across the threshold and immediately arrested the sus-
pect. "'55 Although an unconsented entry may in itself be a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it certainly is not
as intrusive as the kind of invasion of privacy with which Dorman
was concerned.'56 Dorman implicitly acknowledged that the in-
tensity of the intrusion is relevant to the determination of the
reasonableness of a warrantless entry. However, the factors by
which it would gauge this intensity, namely whether the entry
was at day or at night, or was peaceful or forcible, should not be
152. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510-11 n.1 (1971) (White, J.,
dissenting); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 503 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting);
Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717, 726-27 (Mass. 1976) (Quirico, J., dissenting).
153. See text accompanying notes 113-18 supra.
154. See note 126 supra.
155. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
156. None of the cases in which other courts have adopted Dorman for use in their own
jurisdictions involved an intrusion into the home as slight as that which occurs when
police officers make an arrest immediately inside the door. Officers in Johnson did search
the entire apartment, but this was under a pre-Chimel search incident to arrest theory.
Today an arrest immediately inside the door would not support a search of other rooms
of the house.
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exclusive. Rummaging through an entire home during the day,
for instance, may be a greater intrusion than merely stepping
across the home's threshold at night. Thus, the Illinois court
could hold that when a suspect responds to a knock, police offi-
cers can make a warrantless arrest immediately even if such an
arrest requires that the police step inside the home.'57
The American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedures provides another approach to the Dorman problem.15
The A.L.I. would require exigent circumstances only when the
entry to arrest is made between 10 P.M. and 7 A.M. In all other
cases the police could enter without a warrant to make an other-
wise valid arrest of a suspect reasonably believed to be within.
Although the proposal would be easier to administer than a for-
mula like Dorman's which balances numerous factors, it appears
too simplistic. Again the problem is that the intensity of the
intrusion is a function of more than the lateness of the hour of
entry.'59
Perhaps the United States Supreme Court will resolve the war-
rantless entry to arrest question before the Illinois Supreme Court
has occasion to reconsider Johnson. If this does not happen, how-
ever, the Illinois high court should give thoughtful attention to
the contrasting alternatives suggested by Dorman and Watson
157. Such a rule can be supported by reference to a somewhat different situation. The
cases indicate that, even without probable cause, a police officer can knock at someone's
door. If an occupant opens the door and thereby reveals criminal activity in plain view,
the officer can enter to arrest. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 30 Ill.2d 158, 195 N.E.2d 717
(1964). By analogy it would seem permissible for an officer, already having probable cause
to arrest, to step across a threshold to arrest a suspect who is in plain sight after the
suspect or some other occupant has opened the door.
If the suspect, having opened the door and confronted the police, fled into the interior
of the house, under the present suggestion the police then would be able to follow the
suspect so as to effect the arrest. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), would
support such a result. Under facts not precisely identical to the present hypothetical,
Santana held that a suspect could not defeat the officer's right to make an otherwise valid
arrest by fleeing into the suspect's house when the officer approached.
158. ALl MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.6(3) (Approved Draft 1975).
159. Under Illinois law any search warrant can be executed at any hour of the day or
night. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §108-13 (1975). The absence of special requirements for
nighttime execution may suggest either that the hour of entry is not of great concern or
that the strategic advantages of entering at night outweigh negative considerations. In the
arrest context, the Dorman court noted that entry at night may increase the probability
that the suspect is at home, thereby increasing the reasonableness of entry at night. 435
F.2d at 393.
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and to intermediate positions in the dispute concerning warrant-
less entries to arrest.60
III. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON UNEXAMINED PRINCIPLES
This article has examined six issues arising under the Fourth
Amendment which have been resolved differently by Illinois re-
viewing courts than by some other appellate tribunals. In each
area the Illinois courts have not appeared to recognize the contro-
versial nature of the issue before them. They have cited little or
no precedent and have not acknowledged that differing results
have been reached by other courts. In at least two areas, Illinois
courts have even overlooked Illinois precedents which were
directly on point.'6 '
It may be improper, however, to harshly critize the perform-
ance of the Illinois courts. One must suspect that other jurisdic-
tions have given quick treatment to many Fourth Amendment
issues which have received the careful attention of Illinois review-
ing courts. Such is the nature of the appellate process. Every issue
before every court in every case simply cannot be given full con-
sideration.'62 Failure to recognize this simple proposition may be
the major fault of those among us who write in criticism of judi-
cial opinions.
The Supreme Court of Illinois will have further opportunities
to consider the principles discussed in this Article. Petitioners
will urge the court to review the Illinois rules in light of the deci-
160. The confusion engendered by appellate court decisions which ignore Johnson is an
added reason for the Illinois Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal in a case involving a
challenge to a warrantless entry for arrest purposes. See note 121 supra.
161. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
162. In Johnson itself several other then-unsettled constitutional issues were presented,
including the retroactivity of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and the scope of
the right to counsel at lineups. See 45 Ill.2d at 289-92, 259 N.E.2d at 61-62. Johnson was
one of perhaps eight cases orally argued in a single day of the March 1970 Illinois Supreme
Court term. Typically the court during that period had at least nine such heavy days of
oral argument during a period of three weeks. Now that the Illinois Supreme Court func-
tions almost exclusively as a leave-to-appeal tribunal, we can expect that court to be
better able to focus upon controversial legal principles. Litigants may often be required
to demonstrate that the appellate court's decision is debatable before receiving a hearing
on the merits. This, in turn, may mean that the briefs will be more useful to the court in
preparing its opinion.
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sions of other appellate courts. These heretofore unexamined
principles of Illinois Fourth Amendment law deserve the court's
serious attention.
